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Abstract 
The Stiglitz Report published in September 2009 has brought back to the attention of policy 
makers and researchers that measuring a country's development solely on the basis of GDP 
or GDP per capita is not sufficient. An early attempt at multidimensional measurement is 
the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development 
Program in 1990. This measure consists of three components: a health index, an education 
index, and a standard of living index. Even though it was and still is subject to criticism, it is 
the only multidimensional measure that has been around for 20 years and is widely 
accepted by policy makers, who use this measure to compare the state of development of 
their country with those of other countries. They would like to maximize the HDI to improve 
their position in the ranking. As it is a multi-dimensional measure, it is necessary to 
influence different fields of development, which can be done by policy makers via public 
spending. We differentiate between public spending on education, health and general 
spending. This corresponds to the three components of the HDI. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is the region of interest here, the total government budget is limited in most 
countries, so that the only option policy makers have is to allocate the given budget 
efficiently over the three categories. To find the best possible budget allocation, we use an 
optimum portfolio theory approach, which has been adapted to the problem at hand. 
 
The approach consists of two stages. The first stage is concerned with the econometric 
estimation of a linear model that links variation in the policy instruments to the 
corresponding variation in the individual components of the HDI in a given general 
environment implicitly defined by a set of exogenous variables, such as the HIV-rate, 
colonial ancestry, and so on. Using the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regression, we 
estimate the contribution of each instrument to each target as part of a simultaneous 
equations system. As a bonus, we obtain the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. 
In a second stage, we use these estimation results, including the covariance matrix of the 
parameter estimates, to define a portfolio-selection problem, known from financial 
optimum portfolio analysis. In our case, however, the distribution of a given budget of 
government expenditures over the various HDI components constitutes the portfolio 
selection problem, rather than distributing funds over a portfolio of financial assets. In our 
case, an efficient portfolio minimizes the variance (further called V) in the HDI for a given 
expected value of the HDI. We are able to calculate efficient HDI portfolios by varying the 
degree of risk-aversion over a preset range, and tracing the corresponding set of optimum 
portfolios which are necessarily efficient as well. This set can be interpreted as the hull of all 
feasible portfolios in the V,HDI-plane. This set turns out to be convex, as in ordinary financial 
portfolio applications. 
 
We also show how, as the budget increases, these efficient portfolios move through the 
V,HDI-plane in a North-Easterly direction in most cases, following convex expansion paths 
for a given level of risk-aversion, indicating a more than proportional increase of V for a 
given increase in HDI. In some cases we find that these expansion paths are U-shaped, 
suggesting that there is a double dividend in expanding a low total budget in terms of HDI 
gained and V lost, or a 'double punishment' for decreasing an already low budget. We have 
also performed a sensitivity analysis that illustrates the working principles of the general 
approach and the importance of the selection of statistically significant model specifications, 
as statistically insignificant contribution parameters in one or more of the model equations 
in combination with risk-aversion provides a bias against inclusion of corresponding 
expenditures in the optimum development portfolio.  
 
In most country/year combinations we have included in the analysis we find that actual HDI 
performance lags significantly behind the HDI range achievable through efficient spending 
of the actual available budget. Our approach enables us to indicate how existing budgets 
should then be reallocated and how much would be gained in terms of the accompanying 
HDI improvement. 
  
Keywords Human Development Index, Public spending, Optimum Portfolio Theory 
 
JEL classification H5, I, O2 
 
 
 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and 
Technology, UNU-MERIT 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research 
carried out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
 5 
1. Introduction 
In this article we present an approach to designing development policies that takes into account the 
intrinsic uncertainties surrounding the impact of individual development instruments on the 
development goals to be achieved. Instead of using a fully specified structural model that relates 
policy instruments to policy goals and targets, either directly or indirectly, we use a (linear) reduced 
form model that describes the statistical connection between instruments and targets. The benefits of 
this approach are obvious: the time necessary to specify and estimate the model is far less than for a 
fully specified structural model. The disadvantage is also obvious: the model is essentially a black 
box. However, as Friedman (1953) pointed out in the Fifties already, from a practical policy design 
point of view, the most important thing is that the black box actually works, i.e. that a significant link 
between targets and instruments does indeed exist and can be quantified to a sufficiently precise 
degree on the relevant policy range. Because the main aim of this article is to illustrate the working 
principles of our design approach, we will adopt Friedman’s pragmatic stance.  
In policy making, the statistical nature of the relation between targets and instruments is 
usually ignored, except for instances where one uses Monte-Carlo simulations. However, a bonus of 
explicitly acknowledging the statistical nature of the relation between instruments and targets is that it 
is easy to obtain the variance of some linear combination of targets (i.e. of a linear ‘objective 
function’) in terms of the variances in the measured contributions of the individual instruments to 
those targets. The Human Development Index (HDI) takes the form of a linear combination of such 
targets. Maximization of the HDI as the ultimate development target under some scarce resource 
constraint then requires the matrix of the expected values of the contribution coefficients of the 
instruments to the various sub-targets. The econometric estimation of these coefficients usually results 
in a situation where some non-zero (co-) variance of the estimates of the contribution coefficients 
remains. But then, picking some value of a particular instrument also implies picking a contribution of 
that instrument to the variance in the objective-function value. The latter is important, because policy 
makers tend to be risk-averse, and consequently, they could be expected to select from the collection 
of all feasible sets of instruments the one set that would generate the lowest variance for that particular 
objective function value. This particular set is efficient in the sense that it provides the highest 
positively valued result (the HDI) for a given value of a negatively valued result (the corresponding 
HDI variance).  
 The linearity of the HDI implies that its components are perfect substitutes for each-other, 
which is one of the criticisms raised against the HDI, see e.g. Sagar and Najam (1998) and section 2. 
Still, it has been widely accepted as a relevant measure of development, and so do we (also for 
pragmatic reasons). Given the existence of some resource constraint, this causes the exclusive 
selection of the instrument that would generate the highest contribution to the objective function per 
unit of the resource spent. With multiple resource constraints, the set of feasible instruments may 
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become strictly convex, and a combination of different instruments may become optimal rather than 
just a single one. With risk-aversion, such a collection of instruments (further called instruments-
portfolio, or IPF for short) may exist, regardless of the existence of multiple resource constraints, since 
the instruments become effectively imperfect substitutes because of the non-linearities involved in the 
contribution of each instrument to the variance in the objective function, or the portfolio-variance (as 
opposed to the single-instrument variance). Problems of this kind are familiar from financial optimum 
portfolio theory put forward by Markovitz (1952), and later extended by many others (Merton 1969; 
Samuelson, 1969) also in non-financial directions (Helfat, 1988; Seitz and Ellison, 1995; Awerbuch 
and Berger 2003; van Zon and Fuss, 2008; Fuss, 2008). The current article fits into the latter category, 
and is, as far as we know, the first application of the ideas of financial optimum portfolio theory to the 
design of development policies. 
 The article serves two purposes. The first is to show the working principles of the approach, 
also in a development context. To do this, we construct the simplest possible portfolio version of the 
development problem that contains all the components that are strictly necessary to define such a 
problem, no more, no less. The second purpose is to assess its potential relevance for the development 
problem. Therefore the components of the portfolio composition problem themselves are directly 
linked to concepts used in development policy decision making and implementation. The objective 
function, for instance, is translated into manageable modeling terms by taking it to be the 
maximization of a weighted sum of the HDI and its corresponding variance by means of controllable 
public spending on the targets directly contributing to the HDI. We specify this set-up for a large 
group of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, asking ourselves how these countries should spend a 
given budget on the various targets, given the measured variances in the contribution coefficients, and 
given the existence of (different degrees of) risk aversion. It should be noted that limited data-
availability for this group of SSA-countries has forced us to choose as simple a model specification as 
possible for purely pragmatic reasons. Still, the specification chosen works well in statistical terms 
(see also section 4).  
 The article is further organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the different 
parts that make up our approach as well as the alterations/extensions we have made to be able to cover 
the design of efficient development portfolios. In section 3, we give a short overview of the data we 
have collected for our portfolio-exercise, while section 4 provides the estimation results. In section 5 
we discuss the outcomes of our portfolio optimization problem, and investigate the efficiencies and 
inefficiencies involved in the development portfolios of individual SSA-countries as compared to the 
efficient portfolio frontier (further called EPF, for short). We try to assess how much of their 
inefficiencies are due to pure chance and how much due to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. 
In section 6 we provide some concluding remarks.  
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2. Setting the Stage 
2.1 General Outline 
We feel that policy design should take into account that the impact of policies on the development 
process can not be known with complete certainty, and that some combinations of policy measures 
may generate less risk1 than others. In fact, as people (and policy makers) are generally risk-averse, 
policy design should favor combinations of policies that generate the lowest risk for a given expected 
result at the aggregate level and for a given total budget, i.e. the policy portfolio should be efficient. 
 Under conditions of risk, the allocation of resources that have alternative uses, in our case 
public expenditures that could be directed towards alternative expenditure categories, is bound to not 
have the expected/desired effect, or at least not exactly. In addition, it may well be the case that 
realization ‘errors’ for different expenditure categories are correlated with each other. For example, an 
unexpectedly high effectiveness of education expenditures may make health and sanitation 
expenditures ‘unexpectedly’ more effective too. In Optimum Portfolio Theory, further called OPT for 
short, these correlations are taken into account from the outset, in defining efficient financial 
investment portfolios. We want to do the same when defining efficient development portfolios 
(EDPs). 
 We will show that the extension of OPT to cover the design of EDPs is relatively straight 
forward because of the correspondence between assets returns and HDI components on the one hand, 
and adding-up constraints on portfolio shares and those on expenditures on the HDI components on 
the other. The fundamental change in the OPT framework that is necessary for the design of EDPs is 
that of the addition of a (linear) system of simultaneous equations that describes how expenditures on 
the various HDI-components influence these components. We have estimated the parameters of that 
linear system (and their co-variances) for the SSA-countries in our sample. The co-variance matrix 
associated with the estimated contribution coefficients serves much the same function in our set-up as 
the co-variances between the individual asset rates of  return in a pure OPT setting. 
 
2.2 The Human Development Index 
The recent report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress (Stiglitz et al., 2009) has made both policy makers and researchers acknowledge that 
measuring a country’s development solely on the basis of GDP or GDP per capita is not sufficient, 
suggesting that a composite measure including different aspects such as income, health, education, 
environment, freedom, or equality would be more suitable. The biggest drawback to actually 
                                                            
1
 In the literature, a distinction between risk and uncertainty is made. Risk is measurable through a known 
probability distribution, and uncertainty isn’t.  Cf. Knight (1921). 
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establishing such a composite measure is data availability, especially concerning the quality of 
education, health, and the environment on a macroeconomic level as well as inequality. Nonetheless, a 
multidimensional indicator for human development has been around for about 20 years in the form of 
the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). The HDI was first published in the 1990 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1990). It 
measures “the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a 
long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.”2 HDI data are available for more 
than 175 countries and regions. Even though the HDI was criticized from the very beginning regarding 
its incompleteness (e.g. measures of inequality were lacking), the way the index was calculated 
relative to the observed range of variation in the sample, but also the additive fashion in which the 
individual HDI components contributed to the aggregate index, the HDI has, since 1997, converged 
upon a final set of components, i.e. income, health and education (Klugmann et al., 2008). These 
components ensure that the HDI is a measure that can be characterized as ‘universal’, ‘basic to life’, 
and ‘measurable’ (Bérenger and Verdier-Chouchane, 2007). Meanwhile, other indicators addressing 
(some of) the shortcomings of the HDI have been made available as well.3 Aggregate indicators that 
can be seen as complementary to the HDI are for example the Happy Planet Index (Abdallah et al., 
2009), including happy life years and the ecological footprint, or the Human Poverty Index and the 
Gender Related Development Index developed by UNDP. However, for the purpose of illustrating our 
approach, but also because HDI-data are now readily available, we have opted for the HDI as our 
primary measure of development. This has the added bonus of us being able to rephrase the HDI in 
terms of the expected contribution coefficients of the estimated expenditure system, further explained 
in sections 2.4 and 4. Likewise, the variance in the HDI can be shown to depend directly on the co-
variance matrix of these distribution coefficients (see Appendix A for more details). 
 
2.3 Public Spending 
Adopting a particular measure of development like the HDI as an adequate description of the state of 
development then logically implies that policies that are effective in raising the measured level of the 
HDI are to be preferred above policies that are less effective, ceteris paribus. Hence, the measurable 
impacts that alternative policies may have on the HDI may function as a screening device for the 
selection of policies, indeed for the design of a set of policies that may complement each other, i.e. a 
policy-portfolio. Development economists have dealt with the issue of designing effective 
development policies for quite some time. Indeed, there is a wide literature on the effect of aid on 
                                                            
2
 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/. 
3
 For a short overview on other alternative indicators, see Berenger and Verdier-Chouchane (2007), p.1261. 
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development, see for example the special issue of the Review of Development Economics from 2009 
(Mavrotas, 2009).  
The focus of our attention in this article is on the design of internal spending policies, rather 
than on how external aid may affect development. This is in line with the views of African economists 
such as James Shikwati (Shikwati, 2006) or Dambisa Moyo (Moyo, 2009), who criticize monetary 
development aid and propose its complete removal since aid-recipients only become dependent and 
most of it ends up in the hands of corrupt elites (Grill, 2009). Rajan and Subramania (2005) even find 
that aid has a negative impact on growth. In addition to this, if aid is directly channeled to specific 
programs or projects, local policy makers do not necessarily have much of a say in where the aid flows 
go. In light of this discussion we will explore how African policy makers would be able to influence 
development through a better channeling of their public expenditures. Gomanee et al. (2005) take a 
step in that direction by examining the effect of aid on development through public expenditures.  
There are three main approaches to analyzing public expenditure in developing countries. 
First, there is the more descriptive literature about how much the government spends in total, as a 
percentage of GDP, or, more specifically, on which sector; how public spending develops over time 
and how it compares across countries. These descriptions are mostly followed by other types of 
analysis, e.g. the analysis of the impacts of public spending on growth as in Fan and Rao (2003). 
Second, there is the analysis of public spending efficiency, i.e. how effective are, for example, health 
or education expenditures in determining health and education outcomes in different countries and at 
different times (e.g. Herrera and Pang, 2005; Herrera, 2007; Gupta et al., 1997; Jayasuriya and 
Wodon, 2008). Murillo-Zamorano (2004) surveys different efficiency frontier techniques (FDH and 
DEA) in this context. The third strand of literature stems from growth theory, where the effect of 
public spending on long-run economic growth is analyzed, e.g. Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990), 
Devarajan et al. (1996), or Fan and Rao (2003). Only some of these authors distinguish between 
different spending categories such as education or health. Furthermore, this literature measures the 
effects of government expenditure just on economic growth, which, by now, is an indicator considered 
to be too narrow a measure of a country’s overall development.  
Obviously, the EDP-approach we develop in this article fits in with the second (‘efficiency’) 
strand of literature, but it does not stop with the measurement of inefficiencies. It also provides a direct 
indication as to how a reallocation of the public spending budget may improve the effectiveness of 
total spending in improving the Human Development Index.  The only thing that is different is the 
notion of the efficiency of the public spending portfolio itself. The latter is defined not just in terms of 
the maximization of the returns/HDI for a given level of resources available (the ‘traditional’ 
efficiency concept), but also for a given level of the variance in the expected returns/HDI (the 
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‘extended’ efficiency concept from OPT): an EDP requires both ‘traditional’ and ‘extended’ efficiency 
of the allocation of resources. 
 
2.4 Optimum Portfolio Theory and Efficient Development Portfolio Design 
Optimum Portfolio Theory (OPT) was first described in Markovitz (1952). It refers to the problem of 
distributing a given budget over different financial assets, each of them with its own expected rate of 
return and a given co-variance matrix between the expected rates of return of these assets. A 
mathematical formulation of the static portfolio model is relatively straight forward, and we will use it 
as a template for the construction of our Efficient Development Portfolio (EDP) counterpart. In OPT 
an efficient portfolio maximizes the expected portfolio return for a given level of variance in that 
return, or, equivalently, minimizes the variance in the expected return for a given level of that return, 
by a suitable allocation of the budget over all alternatives. So an efficient portfolio exists without 
reference to risk-aversion. The notion of risk-aversion helps to define an optimum portfolio as the 
efficient portfolio for which an infinitesimal reallocation of the budget results in an infinitesimal small 
change in the positively valued expected portfolio return that is exactly offset by an infinitesimal 
change in the negatively valued corresponding portfolio variance. We will use the simplest possible 
portfolio valuation function (i.e. ),( VRΘ ) with a positive contribution of portfolio return (R) and a 
negative contribution of portfolio variance (V), i.e. VR α−=Θ , where 0≥α  is a constant parameter 
and is a measure of the degree of risk-aversion. Consequently, iso-valuation lines in the V,R-plane in 
Figure 1 are defined by: αα // Θ−= RV , where Θ  represents a given and constant level of the 
valuation function. Note that the iso-valuation lines (labeled I, II, III) are straight and have a slope 
given by α/1 . The objective function value is increasing when going from I to II to III, since for a 
given value of V ‘going to the right’ in Figure 1 means an increase in R, hence an increase in the value 
of Θ . 
Figure 1 shows the U-shaped efficient portfolio frontier, where the variance minimizing 
portfolio is represented by point A. This point corresponds to the highest possible degree of risk 
aversion, i.e. an infinitely high α implying a slope of the iso-valuation-lines equal to 01 →α . The 
optimum portfolio, for some given positive and finite value of α  is point B. Note that point C has the 
same V-value as B, but can never be an optimum portfolio, since B has higher return R than C. The 
upward sloping part of the U-shaped curve is therefore the economically relevant part of the curve. It 
follows moreover that for finite values of α  the optimum portfolio given by point B will have both 
higher variance and a higher return than the minimum variance portfolio as given by point A. In 
addition to this, it should be noted that because of the convexity of the relevant part of the EPF the 
same increase in R  tends to be associated with ever stronger increases in V. 
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Figure 1:  The optimum portfolio selection problem 
 
This OPT framework can serve as a template for the design of development policy. For the 
present article, we will be using a static framework, where decisions made in the present do not 
(explicitly) influence those that can be taken in the future.  In such a static setting, policy design à la 
Friedman is relatively straightforward. The extension of the approach to an intertemporal setting is left 
for future research at this point. 
Let t be the T×1 column-vector of HDI components (the policy targets), y be the Y×1 column-
vector of per capita expenditures on Y expenditure categories and let x be the X×1 column-vector of 
exogenous variables of the expenditure system. Furthermore, J is the T×Y matrix of coefficients 
describing the unit-contributions of the expenditure categories to the HDI components, while K is the 
T×X matrix of coefficients linking the exogenous variables to the HDI components. Finally, z’ is the 
transpose of z for any z, while zˆ  is the estimated/expected value of z, i.e. )(ˆ zEz = , and zε  is the 
associated error-vector/matrix (depending on the dimension(s) of z), i.e. zzz ˆ−=ε . Using this 
notation, we can write the expected HDI (denoted by Hˆ ) as: 
TtiH /ˆˆ ′=            (1) 
where i’  is the 1×T summation row-vector.  Moreover, the vector of  the expected values of the HDI 
components can be written as4: 
 
                                                            
4
 This can be regarded as the reduced form of a simplified structural model of African economies. A more 
detailed exposition concerning the choice of this model is given in section 4. 
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xKyJt ˆˆˆ +=            (2) 
The maximization problem we need to solve is: 
)(
ˆˆˆ
)(ˆˆ
/ˆˆ..
ˆˆmax
yExpiB
xKyJt
yVV
TtiHts
VHy
′=
+=
=
′=
−=Θ α
         (3) 
where Vˆ  is the expected variance in the HDI and where B is the per capita budget of government 
expenditures and ∑
=
=′=
Y
i
iyyExpiB
1
)exp()(  is the budget constraint.5 The only qualitative 
difference between this problem and a standard OPT problem is the presence of equation (2) as an 
additional constraint. However, equation (2) can essentially be removed through direct substitution of 
(2) into (1). This step redefines H (comparable in nature to the portfolio return R in the original OPT 
framework) in terms of the products of a number of matrices (J and K), the vector of decision variables 
(y) and the vector of exogenous variables (x), rather than just being the inner-product of the asset 
returns vector r’ and the vector of budget shares as in a standard OPT problem. This makes the 
calculations more cumbersome, but the biggest problem, numerically speaking, is the non-linearity of 
the budget-constraint. The latter implies that the FOC’s that implicitly describe the optimal solution to 
(3) become non-linear themselves. However, using Wolfram’s © Mathematica software, we were able 
to calculate y numerically (and directly) as the solution to a set of simultaneous non-linear equations. 
The derivation of this set of non-linear equations is described in detail in Appendix A. 
 
3. The Data 
For our analysis we need data on the HDI-components, and on public expenditures by HDI-
component. The HDI data stems from HDRO (2009) and is calculated as the arithmetical average of a 
health index (denoted by lex in Table 1) represented by life expectancy, a standard of living index 
(denoted by gdp in Table 1) represented by GDP per capita, and an education index (denoted by edu in 
Table 1), i.e. 3/)( gdpedulexHDI ++= . Using weights other than 1/3 does not substantially change 
the ranking of countries in accordance with their HDI-score, although, of course, it does change the 
                                                            
5
 The variance V is a relatively complicated expression in y that is derived in Appendix A. The non-linearity of 
the budget constraint arises because the coefficient matrices J and K have been econometrically estimated with 
the variables y measured as the natural logarithms of public expenditures on the various expenditure categories. 
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value of the index (Klugman et al., 2008). Note that the three components of the HDI, i.e. edu, lex, and 
gdp, are the elements of our vector of target variables t.  
Data sources for government expenditures are the WHO (2009) and WDI (2009) databases. 
WHO (2009) provides data for per capita government expenditure on health in international PPP$ (our 
variable geh) and for general government expenditure on health as percentage of total government 
expenditure (for now called percenth). From these two we were able to calculate total government 
expenditure in international PPP$ as get = geh/percenth. WDI (2009) provides data on public 
spending on education as a percentage of government expenditure (percentedu). Per capita 
government expenditure on education then is ged = get × percentedu. Remaining government 
expenditures were simply calculated as the residual: geg = get – geh – ged.  
For our computations we use 5-year averages to overcome frequent data gaps, as has for 
example been done in Adler et al. (2009). Thus we end up with values for 1995, 2000, and 2005 for 
about 30 SSA countries. The HDI shows some significant advances over these years, but, 
unfortunately, also a worsening of the index for some countries. The range of HDI values in 1995 was 
between 25% and 75%, which increased to values between 28% and 80% in 2005, while its mean 
remained at 47%. The highest HDI in our sample of SSA countries can be found in Mauritius and the 
lowest in Niger. Most countries have an HDI-score between 0.3 and 0.5. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics endogenous variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
hdi 19 0.47 0.12 0.28 0.80
lex 19 0.40 0.13 0.19 0.79
edu 19 0.55 0.20 0.18 0.83
gdp 19 0.47 0.15 0.32 0.79
get 19 747.80 1055.77 106.93 3264.92
geh 19 79.84 127.38 4.25 465.00
ged 19 137.88 204.76 14.98 666.89
geg 19 530.08 740.61 72.95 2335.20
 
 
Public spending per capita varies greatly between the SSA countries in our sample. Total 
government expenditures per capita (get) in 1995 are between 70 USD and 3200 USD. While the 
minimum steadily increases to more than 100 USD in 2005, the maximum decreases to 2900 USD in 
2000 before increasing again to about 3200 USD per person in 2005. Even though South Africa has 
the highest total spending (get), it lags far behind Botswana in spending on education (ged) and health 
(geh). At the top end of public expenditures per capita are further Mauritius and Namibia. The 
Ethiopia and Niger have the lowest government expenditures per capita. While Ethiopia spends very 
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little on all categories, Niger is doing comparably well on education and health spending. Burundi 
spends least on health (about 4USD per capita per year in all years). 
Originally we employed 20 different exogenous variables which are commonly used as control 
variables when measuring development achievements of different countries (see, for example, the 
literature referenced in section 2). These exogenous variables can be grouped into different indicator 
categories:  structural indicators, development indicators and dummies (former British (GBCD) or 
French (FRCD) colony dummy). Structural indicators, that were used here,  are  population density 
(POPD), urbanization rate (URBR), employment rate (EMPR), the share of agriculture (EAGR), 
industry (EIND), services (ESER), and trade (TRAD) in value added, and the crop production index 
(CROP). Development indicators mostly relate to health issues: immunization against measles 
(IMMU), malaria cases (MALC), HIV (HIVR) and tuberculosis (TBPR) prevalence rates, and access to 
improved water sources (ATSW) and to sanitation facilities (ATSS). We also included aid per capita 
(AIDC), but this turned out to be insignificant in all regression equations, as did several of the other 
variables, given that we included the three government expenditure categories. Descriptive statistics 
for those variables that were finally used in the estimation are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of exogenous variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
gbcd 60 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
popd 60 94.42 138.29 2.01 612.13
urbr 60 32.98 14.51 7.22 60.20
empr 60 65.03 13.51 38.64 86.46
eind 60 26.83 14.38 9.96 82.00
eser 60 45.45 11.47 6.51 65.76
trad 60 75.52 38.32 24.32 200.76
hivr 60 5.71 6.60 0.05 24.88
tbpr 60 397.60 160.67 38.88 682.72
atss 60 34.75 20.76 5.00 94.00
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Estimated Model 
Recall equation (2), i.e. xKyJt ˆˆˆ += . The vector t of policy targets consists of T=3 variables, i.e. 
lex, edu, and gdp, while the vector y consists of M=3 government spending strategies, i.e. government 
expenditures on health (geh), education (ged) and remaining (general) government expenditures (geg). 
Equation (2) can be thought of as the reduced form of a more general structural model, in which the 
target variables themselves are in part dependent on the values of the other target variables as given 
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by: tVxHyLt ˆˆˆˆˆ ++= . Obviously, the latter equation is equivalent to equation (2) when we define 
LVIJ ˆ)ˆ(ˆ 1−−=  and HVIK ˆ)ˆ(ˆ 1−−= . For reasons of simplicity, we stick to equation (2) instead of 
the more general specification including the direct interaction between targets.6 
 
4.2 Results and statistical assessment 
Equation (2) describes the most general specification of our public expenditure system. Each equation 
could in principle have been estimated separately, but in our case we can not exclude the possibility 
that the errors associated with the equations are correlated, because we have had to restrict some of the 
parameter values in J and K to zero. In that case, it is no longer possible to use equation-by-equation 
OLS, and SUR is an appropriate technique.7 We employed the SUR technique using Aitken’s 
generalized least squares, which also provides the co-variances between the parameter estimates of all 
the model-parameters, also those across equations, which are needed to obtain the portfolio-variance 
as used in equation (A.6) in Appendix A. Using SUR ensures that we explicitly take into account the 
interdependencies between the equations.  
Table 3 displays the estimation results for five different specifications of equation (2). 
Specifications 1 through 4 differ with respect to the specific coefficients of the three expenditure 
categories that are constrained to zero in the separate equations. While in specifications 1 and 2, both 
the coefficient of lnged (expenditure on education) and the coefficient of lngeg (remaining 
expenditures) are constrained to zero for the lex-equation (life expectancy index), only the coefficient 
of lngeg is constrained to zero in specifications 3 and 4. When including lngeg in the estimation, none 
of the coefficients corresponding to the expenditure categories were significant. This effect already 
becomes apparent in specifications 3 and 4, where neither of the coefficients of lngeh or lnged was 
significant at 10% (confidence level).  
Specifications 2 and 3 do not restrict the coefficient of lngeg in the edu (education index) 
equation to zero. While the coefficient of lngeh is significant at 1% in all other specifications, it is only 
significant at 10% in specifications 2 and 3. The coefficient of lnged is significant at 10% in 
                                                            
6
 Strictly speaking, there is the possibility that GDP per capita has an influence on total government expenditures 
(through taxes, for example). To take this into account, we would need an additional constraint of the 
form: xUtWy += , with government expenditures y depending on the target variables t , the exogenous 
variables x  and possibly also other variables, resulting in a simultaneous system that could be estimated by 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) or the generalized methods of moments (GMM). Since we are interested in 
measuring the efficiency of the spending of a given budget, rather than explaining how that budget comes about, 
we disregard this possibility, and stick to equation (2). 
7
 SUR stands for the technique of ‘seemingly unrelated regression’ which was developed by Zellner (1962).  The 
SUR technique allows for the possibility that different equations that are using the same data and that are 
supposedly independent of each other, may still have errors that are correlated across the equations (Greene, 
2003). 
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specification 4 only, when it is also included in the lex equation. Still, its value is between 0.03 and 
0.04 in all specifications except for those not restricting lngeg. Also, Aikaike and Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criteria (AIC and BIC) are highest for specifications 2 and 3, so these two seem to be the 
least appropriate of the five specifications. AIC and BIC are third highest for specification 4, where 
neither coefficient of lngeh and lnged are significant in the lex equation.  
Table 3: Estimation results 
 
Specifications Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
lex
lngeh 0.0205 * 0.0204 * 0.0005 0.0005 0.0287 **
lnged 0.0289 0.0290
lngeg
lnurbr 0.0578 ** 0.0583 ** 0.0620 ** 0.0616 ** 0.0616 **
lnpopd 0.0163 * 0.0165 * 0.0132 0.0130 0.0111
lnempr 0.0832
lneser 0.1002 *** 0.0999 *** 0.0588 0.0592 0.1086 ***
lntrad 0.0418 0.0418 0.0249 0.0249 0.0425 *
lntbpr -0.0420 ** -0.0419 ** -0.0491 ** -0.0492 ** -0.0432 **
lnhivr -0.0266 *** -0.0266 *** -0.0293 *** -0.0293 *** -0.0253 ***
gbcd -0.0418 -0.0418 -0.0312 -0.0313 -0.0460 *
const -0.1840 -0.1849 0.0336 0.0346 -0.5782
RMSE 0.0751 0.0751 0.0733 0.0734 0.0747
R-squared 0.6549 0.6549 0.6708 0.6707 0.6585
edu
lngeh 0.0722 *** 0.0555 * 0.0543 * 0.0698 *** 0.0734 ***
lnged 0.0379 0.0253 0.0273 0.0401 * 0.0381
lngeg 0.0415 0.0401
lneind 0.1375 *** 0.1202 *** 0.1211 *** 0.1380 *** 0.1384 ***
lnempr 0.2985 *** 0.3046 *** 0.3018 *** 0.2958 *** 0.3080 ***
lnatss 0.0685 *** 0.0616 ** 0.0620 ** 0.0685 *** 0.0676 ***
gbcd 0.0307 0.0387 0.0386 0.0310 0.0307
free
const -1.7606 *** -1.8329 *** -1.8212 *** -1.7523 *** -1.8051 ***
RMSE 0.1068 0.1061 0.1061 0.1068 0.1068
R-squared 0.6857 0.6900 0.6900 0.6858 0.6858
gdp
lngeh 0.0431 *** 0.0439 *** 0.0413 *** 0.0405 *** 0.0444 ***
lnged
lngeg 0.0797 *** 0.0786 *** 0.0819 *** 0.0830 *** 0.0780 ***
lnurbr 0.0328 ** 0.0329 ** 0.0323 ** 0.0322 ** 0.0332 **
lnpopd 0.0099 ** 0.0099 ** 0.0098 ** 0.0098 ** 0.0100 **
gbcd -0.0180 -0.0181 -0.0176 -0.0174 -0.0182
const -0.2513 *** -0.2486 *** -0.2557 *** -0.2583 *** -0.2477 ***
RMSE 0.0483 0.0483 0.0482 0.0482 0.0483
R-squared 0.8923 0.8922 0.8924 0.8925 0.8922
Number of obs. 60 60 60 60 60
D o F 22 23 24 23 23
AIC -394.85 -393.43 -392.82 -394.26 -393.96
BIC -348.78 -345.26 -342.55 -346.09 -345.79
Note. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Specification 5 differs from specification 1 in the control variables. It additionally includes 
lnempr in lex. Including the employment rate, which is not significant in lex, slightly improves the fit 
of the regression (measured by 2R ) and lowers the mean squared error (RMSE). The value of this 
coefficient is similar to those in specifications 1 and 4, but neither AIC nor BIC indicate that 
specification 4 outperforms specification 1, which therefore seems to be the most appropriate.  
There is no indication of either heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, so that specification 1 is 
valid and efficient. Still, as shown in our analysis in section 5.4 regarding the sensitivity of the final 
outcomes with respect to specifications spec1-spec5, we do have to keep in mind that the results do 
depend on the correct specification of the model. From now on we will concentrate on the results from 
specification 1, to show the applicability of the EDP method to developing development policies.  
 
4.3 Results and impact of policy instruments on HDI components 
As the signs of the coefficients of all types of government expenditures in Table 3 are positive, an 
increase in government spending improves the value of the individual HDI components. However, not 
all expenditure categories are equally important for all the HDI components. Only government 
expenditures on health seem to have an impact on the life expectancy index. These expenditures are 
also important for the other two indices (edu and gdp). Education expenditures have a lower impact 
(about 0.038) on the education index than health expenditures (about 0.072). Remaining government 
expenditures are not significant for lex or edu, but are important for the GDP index (the coefficient is 
positive and significant at 1%). 
The index for life expectancy at birth is higher if urbanization rate (lnurbr), population density 
(lnpopd), employment rate (lnempr), share of services in total value added (lneser), and trade as 
percentage of total value added (lntrad) are higher, and if tuberculosis and HIV prevalence rate are 
lower. Former British colonies (gbcd) seem to have a lower life expectancy at birth index but better 
education index than former non-British colonies. The share of industry in total value added (lneind), 
the employment rate (lnempr), and the percentage of population with access to safe sanitation (lnatss) 
have a positive impact on the education index. The GDP index (gdp) is positively influenced by the 
degree of urbanization (lnurbr) and higher population density (lnpopd). Again, being a former British 
colony has a negative, though not very significant, impact. 
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5. Portfolio Application Results 
5.1 Tracing the EPF 
Given the estimates for the matrices J and K, including the cross-equation co-variances  of the 
parameter estimates, the variance of the HDI (V) can be calculated as described in Appendix A, 
equation (A.6), and the EDP optimization problem, equation (A.7), can be solved for every country 
and for every year for which a full data-set is available. The EPF for a given budget for some country 
in some year can be (graphically) traced by calculating a sequence of optimum development 
portfolio’s for a range of values of the risk-aversion parameterα . In our case, the range for all values 
of α  is given by x5.1=α for all integer values of x from -19 to 9, implying that α  increases by 50 
percent for each unit increase in x.8 We also varied the budget over a range as given by aB 250 ⋅=  
for all integer values of a in between 0 and 6 (cf. varying colors in Figures 2a and 2b). This budget 
range coincides with the observed range of variation for the actual budgets over the countries and 
years under consideration. The actual ETH 1995 (Ethiopia) per capita budget is only slightly higher 
than the budget low-bound of 50$ per capita, while MUS 2005  (Mauritius) is close to the budget 
high-bound of 3200$ per capita. In addition to this, we traced the EPF for the actually observed per 
capita budget (black curve). In the graphs, the variance (V) of an efficient development portfolio is 
plotted against its corresponding HDI-value (H).9  The resulting EPF has a convex shape, as we would 
expect, given the resemblance of our EDP-composition-problem with an ‘ordinary’ OPF-problem. The 
results shown below include the actual HDI given by UNDP (represented by the vertical line), and the 
predicted HDI from our model (obtained by substituting equation (2) into (1)) and its corresponding 
variance for the actual budget (denoted by the position of the ‘star’).  Therefore, if the actual budget 
would be spent efficiently, the ‘star’ would need to be on the black EPF, save for the occurrence of 
random shocks in the contribution to the various targets of our model variables. Each point in the V,H-
plane corresponds to a specific probability distribution, the higher the variance, the thicker the tails of 
the corresponding distribution and hence, the more likely to draw an HDI value that is further away 
from the expected value. Burkina Faso (Figure 2a), for example, has been ‘unlucky’, while Botswana 
(Figure 2b) has had a lucky draw as the actual HDI of the latter country exceeds the predicted HDI, 
and that of the former country falls below the predicted value. We will come back to this in more 
                                                            
8
 We found no significant numerical trouble in calculating the OPF’s for this wide range of values, but for even 
slightly wider ranges we did. For 205.1 −=α  LSO 2005 starts giving numerical trouble. Such trouble also arises 
for 105.1≥α . However, the remaining range for α is wide enough to be empirically relevant, as the implied 
slopes of the iso-valuation lines get close enough to zero and infinity. 
9
 To avoid numerical problems, we have multiplied the K and J matrices by a factor 103, and the elements of the 
covariance matrix Ω  by 106 (Var(1000x) = 1000²Var(x)) in order to retain a sufficient degree of numerical 
precision while tracing the EPFs for a wide range of α ’s. This has the effect of multiplying the expected HDI 
and its standard-deviation (being the square root of the variance) by a factor 103 as well.  
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detail in the next section that deals with the measurement of the impact of policy inefficiencies and 
pure chance on HDI scores. 
The sequence of EPFs obtained by varying the budget over the budget-range of  50-3200 
dollars per capita can essentially be classified using two different ‘shape-classes’. First, there are EPF 
sequences that have (near) constant variance for low budgets, but then increasing variance for higher 
budgets (and correspondingly higher levels of HDI) for the highest value of α  (i.e. the low-end of the 
EPF). An example that falls into this particular ‘increasing’ shape-class is Burkina Faso in 1995, see 
Figure 2a10. But sometimes it is the case that for the lowest budgets, the low-ends of the low budget-
EPFs exceed those of higher budget EPFs. This suggests that in some cases, an expansion of the 
budget may give rise to a ‘development double dividend’ for risk-averse development policy makers: 
they could simultaneously improve their HDI score and reduce the riskiness of that score by 
increasing spending. In fact, in the example provided in Figure 2b, we see that the Botswana policy-
makers have apparently been able to identify the size of the budget for which the double dividend 
becomes a trade-off between risk and return again, since an increase in the budget above the actual 
budget would tend to raise HDI but at the expense of a higher associated risk. The shape explained 
here is called ‘U-shape’ in the remainder of the article. 11 
Figure 2a: EPFs in Burkina Faso (1995) 
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10
 One should keep in mind that the observations for 1995 are actually the 5 year averages over the years 1993-
1997. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the observations for 2000 and 2005. 
11
 Strictly speaking, it is possible that there is only one U-shaped class, of which the monotonically increasing 
shape class is a special case (i.e. numerically covering only the right-arm of the U-shape). For the moment this 
question is left for future research. 
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5 countries belong to the first group (‘increasing’): BDI, BFA, ETH, MDG, and UGA;12 and 24 
countries to the second group (‘u-shaped’): BEN, BWA, COG, CIV, CMR, COM, GHA, GMB, GNB, 
GNQ, LSO, MLI, MRT, MUS, MWI, NAM, NER, RWA, SEN, TCD, TGO, SWZ, ZAF, and ZMB. 
Of these countries, BEN, CMR, MLI and ZMB could definitely benefit from the double-dividend 
situation they are in by increasing their budget, since their ‘black’ EPFs are entirely to the left of the 
minimum in their respective U-shaped EPF-sequences. The EPFs corresponding to the actual budget 
of for example BWA, COG and CIV though are almost at the point of minimal possible variance. 
 Figure 2b: EPFs in Botswana (1995) with U-shape 
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5.2 Performance Measurement 
The EPFs that we have traced for all countries, all years and all budgets are all convex, as expected. 
However, the observed HDI does not necessarily intersect with the black EPF (i.e. the EPF achievable 
with the observed budget), nor is it necessarily the case that the ‘star’, i.e. the combination of predicted 
HDI and variance for the actual budget, lies on the black EPF. The deviation of the actual HDI from 
its expected value (as given by HDI-coordinate of the ‘star’) must be due to statistical flukes.13 
However, the difference between the HDI-coordinate of the ‘star’ and that of the point on the EPF 
                                                            
12
 See Appendix A3 for the definition of the country names and labels. 
13
 Strictly speaking, the error could also be due to a misspecification of the model, which could make the country 
under observation differ from the ‘representative’ country covered by our estimated model. Obviously, we make 
the implicit assumption that our linear model is completely and correctly specified. Also using estimation 
specifications 2 to 5 for this analysis we find that the resulting relative positions of the black EPF, the predicted 
HDI (the star), and the actual HDI (black vertical line) do not change in the vast majority of cases. The only 
exceptions to this are BDI1995, GNQ1995, and ZMB 1995, where the predicted HDI is very close to the actual 
HDI for all specifications. 
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with the same V-coordinate must be due to inefficiencies in the allocation of the public development 
budget. This non-stochastic part of the extended efficiency losses associated with such inefficiency 
can be removed by changing the budget allocation such that the ‘star’ will be on the (black) EPF. 
Recall that the extended efficiency is the objective function value Θ , i.e. the positively valued HDI 
minus its variance multiplied by α . In this section we will measure the minimum amount by which 
extended efficiency could be improved for a given budget, by efficiently spending that budget. 
 Figure 3. Extended Efficiency Measurements 
 
In Figure 3, point C (the ‘star’) depicts the V,H-coordinates that correspond with the expected 
values associated with the actual budget allocation, while the dotted vertical through point K 
corresponds with the actual realisation of the HDI. The EPF is the convex curve through points E and 
G. Point E is some point on the EPF that would be chosen by a person with an α  equal to the co-
tangent of the angle ϕ . This is because the line tangent to the convex EPF in point E is an iso-
valuation line, given by EEEE VH α−=Θ , implying that EEEEE HV αα // Θ−=  (the 
superscript E here refers to point E on the EPF). Note that this iso-valuation line represents the highest 
value of the objective function that a person with Eαα =  can achieve. Point E would represent the 
optimum portfolio for that person. That person would value point C using the same Eα , and obtain an 
objective function value given by the H-coordinate of point A on the horizontal axis.14  But since C 
and A are on the same iso-valuation line, the objective function value in C is also equal to the HDI 
coordinate of point A. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for points B and D.  
                                                            
14
 On the horizontal axis, the V-coordinate is zero, so the objective function value associated with some point on 
the horizontal axis must be equal to the HDI-coordinate. 
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In order to measure the potential size of extended efficiency improvements due to more 
efficient spending, we would like to know the minimum improvement that people could achieve by 
moving from a point like C to some point on the EPF, say a point like E, i.e. we are looking for (a 
person with) a degree of risk-aversion Eα  that implicitly defines point E such that the extended 
efficiency gain ( ∆Θ ) from the move from C to E would be minimal. Hence, having any other degree 
of risk aversion results in an even larger gain, implying that everybody will at least be as well off as 
the person with risk-aversion Eα .  
The extended efficiency gain from a move from C to E is given by: 
)( CEECECE VVHH −−−=Θ−Θ=∆Θ α      (4) 
A movement along the EPF can be interpreted as a change in V that comes from a change in H 
that in turn is caused by a change in Eα . But then, minimisation of (4) with respect to Eα  implies: 
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Since EE HV ∂∂ / is the slope of the EPF in point E, we must have that EEE HV α/1/ =∂∂ . But then 
(5) implies that CE VV = , i.e. the point on the EPF that represents the smallest improvement of the 
objective function relative to point C must have the same V-coordinate as point C. Hence, the point we 
are looking for must be point G 15, and the extended efficiency gain involved in moving from C to G is 
given by the length of the line-segment in between those two points and is measured in HDI-units. 
Note, however, that the corresponding extended efficiency levels (in equivalent HDI-terms) are given 
by the HDI coordinates of the points of intersection of the parallel dotted lines (with single arrow 
heads) through C and G with the horizontal axis. 16  
Unfortunately, the extended efficiency function that we use does not have a ‘natural’ point 
zero. People with high degrees of risk-aversion may be faced with negative values of the objective 
                                                            
15
 The second derivative 0/// 22 >∂∂⋅∂−∂=∂∆Θ∂ EEEEE HHV αα since a higher degree of risk-
aversion would lower both H and V, i.e. 0/ <∂∂ EEH α . The extended efficiency gain is therefore indeed 
minimised when moving from C to G, since the second derivative is positive. 
16
 Obviously, since the dotted lines with single arrows in Figure 3 are parallel, the HDI-difference between 
points C and G is exactly equal to the HDI difference between points A and B. The latter difference, however, 
represents the extended efficiency difference between points A and B (since the variance component is zero in 
both points A and B), and so the HDI-difference between points C and G is also equal to the extended efficiency 
difference between these points, we can therefore interchange extended efficiency and HDI differences, as we 
have done in Figure 3. 
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function and be perfectly happy with that. In that case relative changes in the objective function value 
make little sense, even though absolute changes still do. We will therefore provide information in 
terms of absolute changes.  
The extended efficiency contributions of both the transitory and the structural components are 
shown in Figure 4 for all country/year combinations for which a full data-set is available. The 
calculations are based on Figure 3, where point G is the point of reference, and the total extended 
efficiency surplus consists of two components, since }{}{ GCCKGK Θ−Θ+Θ−Θ=Θ−Θ . The 
first bracketed term represents the extended efficiency surplus over the expected value of extended 
efficiency, given the way in which the budget was spent in actual fact (if positive, we were lucky). The 
second bracketed term represents the extended efficiency surplus of the way in which the actual 
budget was spent over the extended efficiency associated with an efficient spending of the same 
budget. Obviously, one would expect the latter surplus to be negative, or at most equal to zero if the 
actual budget allocation would have proved to be efficient, and this is what we can observe in Figure 
417, where the extended efficiency changes mentioned above have been expressed in equivalent HDI 
changes (see Figure 3 and note 16).  
 
5.3 Allocation inefficiencies 
Figure 4 below has some striking features. First of all, allocation inefficiencies are relatively important 
for Burundi (BDI), and consistently so.  At the same time, the contribution of pure chance has been of 
limited size, so that the negative extended efficiency effects for Burundi are mainly structural in 
nature. However, these extended efficiency deficits could be fixed, by adopting more efficient 
spending programs. By contrast, Ethiopia (ETH) has consistently been lucky, although the 
contribution of pure luck has fallen and that of efficient resource allocation has risen over time. Other 
countries that have seriously suffered from bad luck, which is defined here as a transitory loss of more 
than 5 percentage points are BWA2005, BFA1995, BFA2005, GMB1995, LSO2005, MLI2000,2005, 
RWA2005, SEN2005 whereas such countries as BWA1995, CMR2000,2005, GHA1995, MDG2000, 
NAM1995,2000, ZAF1995, but also TOG1995-2000 and UGA1995 have been lucky using the same 
measure. 
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 There are some minor positive deviations, however, that are due to the fact that we obtain the value of Gα  
numerically using Mathematica’s Interpolation function that represents the black EPF as an interpolation of the 
outcomes of the efficient combinations of V and H that we have calculated for the range of α ’s discussed 
above. We then invert this interpolated function to obtain the α  corresponding to a certain value of the variance 
V. This variance V is the value that we can calculate using equation (A.6) for the observed budget allocation. 
The resulting value of α  is then used to evaluate the implied objective function value for that interpolated value 
of V, as we also have obtained HDI along the EPF as an interpolated function of  α . 
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Figure 4. Extended efficiency surpluses and deficits 
 
A major overall result is that the contribution of pure chance or ‘fate’ is generally of considerable 
importance. However, the bonus of experiencing inefficiencies instead of being confronted with fate is 
that the former can be tackled, whereas, in principle, fate can not. Nonetheless, we have tried to 
correlate the various extended efficiency deviations from Figure 4 (but now scaled by the budget in 
order to take differences in budget-sizes and their impact on HDI scores into account) with some 
governance indicators, the hypothesis being that both fate and bad allocation decisions might have 
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something to do with the lack of quality of governance. To this end, we calculated the correlations (K-
tau and Spearman because of their small sample properties) between extended efficiency deviations 
and different governance indicators. The latter are the Freedom house political rights (FHPR) and civil 
liberty (FHCL) index and a combination of these two, called FREE.18 
 
Table 4. Extended efficiency surplus and Governance correlations 
 FHPR  FHCL  FREE  FHPR  FHCL  FREE
OBJ(K) - OBJ(G)
 0.074  0.123 -0.117  0.136  0.204 -0.182
OBJ(C) - OBJ(G) -0.317*** -0.371***  0.306*** -0.482*** -0.555***  0.483***
OBJ(K) - OBJ(C) -0.072 -0.050  0.024 -0.109 -0.079  0.054
Note. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
OBJ(K)-OBJ(G) = total extended surplus (+/-), measured relative to efficient point G
OBJ(C)-OBJ(G) = extended efficiency surplus (+/-) due to efficient/inefficient budget allocation
OBJ(K)-OBJ(C) = extended efficiency surplus (+/-) due to good/bad luck, measured relative to point G
K-tau Spearman
 
 
The correlations between these governance indicators and the partial and total deviations are 
shown in Table 4. It becomes immediately clear that a relatively high extended efficiency surplus due 
to efficient spending is positively correlated with good governance, indicated by the highly significant 
correlations in the second row of Table 4. These correlations of the surplus and governance are 
negative for FHPR and FHCL (where high values indicate bad governance), and positive for FREE 
(where low values indicate bad governance).  The correlations of total extended efficiency surplus 
with the governance indicators, displayed in the first row, are of the same sign, but no longer 
significant. This underlines both the practical importance and the unpredictability of the contribution 
of fate to the total extended efficiency surplus. Nonetheless, even though the extended efficiency 
contribution of inefficiencies in government spending is relatively limited, these inefficiencies are 
heavily correlated with governance indicators, suggesting that extended efficiency improves as the 
quality of governance increases. 
In order to establish the practical importance of reducing inefficiencies in government 
spending, the most important information from Figure 4, i.e. the potential (minimum) improvement in 
extended efficiency due to a move from point C to point G in Figure 3, has been presented again in 
Figure 5. We see that countries like COG 2005 and MRT 2005 would benefit greatly from more 
efficient government spending. This holds a fortiori for BDI 2000 in which the potential 10 percentage 
                                                            
18
 Both FHPR and FHCL are measured on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom 
and 7 the lowest. FREE on the other hand is equal to 1, if the average of FHPR and FHCL is lower than 3.5 (i.e. 
a country is relatively free), equal to 0.5 for an average between 3.0 and 5.5, and 0 for an average higher than 
5.5. 
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point increase in HDI represents a proportional increase of 30 percent relative to the expected HDI, 
which is extremely low to start with for BDI 2000, i.e. slightly above 30 percent. For some other 
countries too, more efficient government spending can bring about relative changes in those countries’ 
HDI of more than 10 percent. Examples are MWI 1995, MLI 2000, GNQ 2000 and LSO 2000. Given 
that the average HDI of the sample countries is 0.47, for most countries the potential increase in HDI 
is limited to less than 10 percent of the expected HDI. Nonetheless, an increase of even a few 
percentage points in the HDI of a country may be of considerable practical importance for the people 
involved, as it could make the difference between being just alive and being able to make a living.  
Figure 5. Possible improvement in HDI (in % points) with efficient spending  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The question now is what the removal of inefficiencies requires in terms of the reallocation of 
the government budget. To answer this question, we have calculated the percentage point differences 
between the budget distributions in points G and point K in Figure 3, for each country/year 
combination for which we have a complete data-set. In order to be able to assess the practical 
significance of the changes in the budget allocation thus calculated, we also present the actual budget 
allocation as a radar plot in Figure 6, to give an impression of the size of the numbers involved and the 
variation in these numbers over countries and over time. Figure 7 contains the differences between the 
efficient budget distribution and the actual budget distribution over the three categories, i.e. the 
percentage point change in the budget allocation that would be needed to make the development 
portfolio efficient and to realize the percentage point HDI gains shown in Figure 5. 
 27 
Figure 6. Actual budget distribution (% shares)  
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that the share of general government spending is relatively high, and relatively stable 
at around 70 to 80 percent of the total budget, with just a few exceptions in which the share exceeds 80 
percent (like BFA1995, BDI2000, CMR2000, TCD2005, COG2000,2005, GNQ1995,2000 and 
MRT2005) and a few more in which the share is below 70 percent. This generally leaves little to 
distribute over health and education expenditures. The share of education expenditures (labeled 
SGED) takes roughly 20 percent of the budget, while health expenditures (labeled SGEH) take the 
remainder, i.e. only about 5 to 10 percent. It should be noted that the countries that are below average 
general government spenders spend relatively more on education. The variation in education and 
health expenditure shares between countries is larger than the variation in general government 
expenditure shares.  
Looking at Figure 7, we can make an important observation. In the vast majority of cases, 
extended efficiency could be improved by increasing the budget spending shares of education and 
health. In cases where the budget reallocation is of considerable size we see that most of the drop in 
general government expenditures goes to health expenditures and less to education, thus effectively 
making the distribution of the budget more even among the three categories. There are very few 
countries where general government budget expansions are wanted, and if so, the increase in the share 
of general government expenditures amounts to just a few percentage points. These countries are the 
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ones that were already spending their budgets relatively efficiently (see also Figure 4). However, there 
are quite a few countries for which large reductions (20% or more) in the share of general government 
expenditures are wanted, or, equivalently, equally large increases in the joint share of expenditures on 
health and education are/would have been required. These countries are BDI1995-2005, COG2000-
2005, GNB1995-2000, MWI1995, MRT2005, NGA1995, ZMB1995. 
 
Figure 7. Percentage point differences efficient and actual budget distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In Figures 8a-8c we present the plots of the expenditure shares in the various specifications in Table 3 
for each country/year combination against each corresponding country year combination in our 
preferred specification 1. The thick black line in each Figure represents a reference line as it is 
associated with specification 1 against specification 1, hence the unit-slope.  
When plotting the EPF’s for the different specifications in Table 3, we found that the general 
shape and position of these EPF’s in V,H-space did not change much (not shown here). More variation 
could be observed in the underlying expenditure shares, even though specifications 5 and 1 are 
remarkably similar, indicating that the employment rate impact (the only ‘real difference’ between 
specifications 1 and 5), including the contribution of its co-variance does not do much. Fairly similar 
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are the results of specification 1 and 4. Still, specification 4 involves a structural three percentage point 
change in the share of education expenditures at the expense of general expenditures. This is because 
education now also has an impact on health, so there is a double-dividend to education expenditures in 
specification 4 as compared to specification 1.  
Figure 8a. Health expenditure sensitivity results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a striking difference between specifications 2 and 3 on the one hand, and 
specification 1 on the other. The cause of the difference is the relatively large positive coefficient of 
lngeg in the edu equation in combination with that coefficient being insignificant, i.e. showing a 
relatively large (co-)variance. Both aspects are important, because on the one hand the double 
dividend of general expenditures now raises the share of the latter, while on the other hand the 
increased contribution of lngeg to portfolio variance introduces a motive to move out of these 
expenditures, and more so if these expenditures are relatively high raising the other expenditure shares 
in the process. This has the effect of reducing the slopes of the lines reflecting the correlations between 
specifications 2 and 3 on the one hand and specification 1 on the other. Still, according to the 
econometric model, lngeg is not significant in edu, and even though the adjusted R-squared suggest a 
better fit of either specifications 2 or 3, the Aikaike and Bayesian-Schwarz Information Criteria are 
higher for these two specifications compared to the other three specifications, suggesting that 
specifications 1, 4, and 5 are to be preferred over specifications 2 and 3 on purely statistical grounds. 
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Figure 8b. Education expenditure sensitivity results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8c.  General government expenditure sensitivity results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 In this article we have presented the outlines of a method that enables the assessment of the 
efficiency by which development is promoted in SSA countries through local government spending. 
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We describe the process of development through its associated impact on the Human Development 
Index (HDI). A sensitivity analysis concerning the widely criticized linear aggregation scheme with 
equal weights for the three indexes is left for future research. The purpose of the present exercise is to 
show the application possibilities of the method in this field.  
To this end, we estimate a simple cross SSA country simultaneous system of equations that 
links government expenditures on the three HDI components to the scores on the three HDI 
components in a setting that allows for exogenous differences between countries that would determine 
the general setting in which the underlying development processes are taking place, and that define in 
part the effectiveness of government spending in raising the HDI components. By estimating this 
system of equations, we obtain measures of the risk associated with using the three spending 
instruments. We make the assumption that policy-makers are risk-averse, implying that they would 
prefer a policy outcome of spending a given budget on the three HDI components with a particular 
expected value of the HDI outcome and a corresponding variance of that outcome above a policy with 
the same expected HDI but a higher variance of that outcome. This setting resembles the one known 
from Optimum Portfolio Theory (OPT), but it extends the OPT setting by allowing for multiple 
constraint on the use of (policy-) instruments. In our case, the simultaneous estimation model forms an 
additional set of constraints next to the government budget adding-up constraint and the one that links 
the value of the HDI to its components. 
 In our setting, an efficient development portfolio is a distribution of the government budget 
that minimizes the variance of the HDI for a given expected value of the HDI. We find that the EPF’s 
can be represented as convex upward sloping graphs in the variance, HDI-plane. Using this setting, we 
are able to define a point on the EPF of each SSA country that marks the minimum increase in 
extended efficiency (a measure that includes both the expected HDI and its variance) that could be 
realized by an efficient spending of the government budget. We then show how the actual performance 
of each SSA country can be split into a transitory component brought upon these countries by good or 
bad luck, and a structural component that is linked to good/bad budget allocation decision making. We 
show that the good/bad luck component is of considerable importance. However, to some extent it 
may be the case that what we have called ‘luck’, is actually a ‘measure of our ignorance’. For now we 
have to leave the potential reduction of that ignorance for future research.  
The structural extended efficiency loss component is correlated with a number of governance 
indicators pointing to the ‘rule of thumb’ that good governance is associated with efficient budget 
spending and bad governance with inefficient spending. We also show that the changes in the 
composition of the budget for countries that are spending inefficiently are considerable, i.e. 
expenditures on health and education should be increased by 20 percentage points or more, whereas in 
most cases expenditures on health and education are of the order of 20 percent to start with. Hence, 
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efficient reallocation requires a doubling of the health and education budget, and a more equal 
distribution of the overall budget over the three expenditure categories. For some countries, general 
government expenditures need to be raised, but only by a small amount, and the other categories need 
to be adjusted accordingly. This is the case only for countries that are already spending relatively 
efficiently.  
The sensitivity analysis we performed led to the conclusion that the shape and position of the 
EPF as well as the predicted HDI are robust to different estimation specifications, while the necessary 
budget changes to get to the EPF show more variability. Using specifications with insignificant 
parameter contributions by some expenditure category does introduce a bias against using that 
category through its relatively high (co-) variance in combination with risk-aversion. We conclude that 
estimating the model correctly is essential for applying the method and interpreting the results. 
 
 33 
 Appendix A. Derivation of the EDP FOC’s 
In this appendix we show how the FOC’s can be derived that implicitly describe the solution 
to the maximization problem provided in (3). First, it should be noted that errors in H can only be 
caused by errors in t. Hence, from (1) it follows that: 
Ti tH /εε ′=            (A.1) 
Moreover, assuming that we know both y  and x  with absolute certainty19, it follows from (2) that: 
xyxKKyJJxKyJxKyJtt KJt εεε +=−+−=−−+=−= )ˆ()ˆ()ˆˆ()(ˆ         (A.2) 
Note that (A.2) assumes that there are no measurement errors in x or implementation errors in y nor 
any other (forecast) errors.  Using (A.1), the variance in the HDI is given by: 
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In equation (A.3) tiε  is the i-th element in the error-vector tε , i.e. it represents the error (i.e. the 
deviation from expectation) in target variable i. Using equation (A.2), it follows that: 
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Substituting (A.4) into (A.3), we get: 
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19
 The assumption that we know y  with certainty is always valid as policy makers set the amount of 
government spending. However, it is possible that x  cannot be known with complete certainty due to 
measurement errors or something similar, in which case we would also have to include the variation in x in the 
calculation of tε . Even though it is relatively straight forward to include this source of variance (by means of a 
linearization of the term xK  in equation (A.2) around its expected value), we haven’t done this here for reasons 
of simplicity. 
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The expectation terms in equation (A.5) actually refer to specific elements from the co-variance matrix 
of the parameter estimates of our linear system. This co-variance matrix is symmetric, and consists of 
T2 sub-matrices (associated with each combination of targets) further called Yjiji ..1,, =∀Ω  with 
dimensions (Y+X) × (Y+X). Each sub-matrix in turn is partitioned into 4 sub-matrices of dimensions 
Y×Y, Y×X, X×Y and X×X, further called YYji,Ω , 
YX
ji,Ω ,
XY
ji,Ω  and 
XX
ji,Ω , respectively (see also Figure A.1 
below). YYji,Ω  is the co-variance matrix between the expenditure parameter estimates (as captured by 
the J matrix in equation (2)) for the target variables i and j, while YXji,Ω  is the co-variance matrix of the 
expenditure parameter estimates in the equation for target variable i and the parameter estimates of the 
exogenous variables (as captured by the matrix K) in the equation for target variable j. XYji,Ω  and XXji,Ω  
are similarly defined. Using this notation, it follows from (A.3) and (A.5) that the variance in H, i.e. V, 
can be written as: 
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where  ZΩ  represents the arithmetical average over all XXYXXYYYZZ ji ,,,, =∀Ω .20  
Replacing t in (1) by (2), and inserting (2) into the objective function, the Lagrangian of the 
maximization problem (3) is given by: 
))((/)ˆˆ())((ˆ yExpiBVTxKyJiyExpiBVH ′−+−+′=′−+−=Φ λαλα     (A.7) 
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, and )(yExp  stands for the column-
vector ))(..)()(( 21 ′TyExpyExpyExp . Maximizing (A.7) by a suitable choice of y results in the 
following FOC for y: 
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Note that equations (A.8) and the per capita budget constraint )(yExpiB ′=  define T+1 non-linear 
simultaneous equations in the T+1 unknowns y and λ , the solution of which we obtain using 
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Mathematica’s FindRoot routine. The solution depends on all the elements of the matrix Jˆ , the co-
variances in YXXYYY ΩΩΩ ,,  and on α . By varying α  over a predefined range, we can calculate the 
corresponding solution of the simultaneous system and so trace the corresponding EDP, since the 
optimum development portfolio must be efficient as well. Note, moreover, that λ  is the shadow price 
of the per capita budget, i.e. it measures by how much the objective function would rise for a one unit 
increase in the per capita budget.  
 
Figure A.1 Co-variance matrix partitions 
 
 
Appendix B. Variance-covariance matrix of parameter estimates 
Next to the parameter coefficients of the SUR estimation, their cross-equation variance-
covariance matrix plays a crucial role in our model, as shown in Appendix A. The overall structure of 
this covariance matrix is provided in Figure A.1 above, which shows how the particular Ω -partitions 
taken together make-up the covariance matrix. The numerical values in the covariance matrix are 
provided in Tables B.1-B.6. Note that in our formal notation, the number of exogenous and 
endogenous variables included as independent variables in each equation is the same. However, in 
Table B.1 we have left out those columns and rows from the Ω –partitions containing only zero’s. 
These zero-values arise, as the statistically insignificant impact parameters have been set equal to zero, 
and so are the implied values for the elements in the covariance matrix of such independent variables 
therefore (if they are not there, they can’t co-vary). An example is the independent variable lnhivr (the 
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HIV-prevalence rate) that contributes to the health target variable but not to the other targets. 
Consequently the lnhivr rows are missing for the other targets, and so are the corresponding columns, 
because of the overall symmetry of the covariance matrix.  
Table B.1 Covariance matrix elements HHΩ  
lngeh lnurbr lnpopd lneser lntrad lntbpr lnhivr gbcd _cons
lngeh 128.25
lnurbr -65.09 605.36
lnpopd 16.10 66.11 75.47
lneser -118.99 -194.34 -59.38 1056.77
lntrad -101.30 -237.05 1.98 355.64 672.86
lntbpr 57.93 79.14 101.14 -65.52 9.43 421.97
lnhivr -30.97 11.09 -10.32 51.84 12.79 -60.88 48.58
gbcd 15.79 18.32 -8.28 -114.77 -56.43 -22.67 -43.48 685.98
_cons 288.03 -811.29 -918.98 -3846.76 -3092.65 -3038.00 179.44 627.94 50241.67
lex
le
x
 
 
Table B.2 Covariance matrix elements EHΩ  
lngeh lnurbr lnpopd lneser lntrad lntbpr lnhivr gbcd _cons
lngeh 18.25 -0.64 1.63 -43.08 -20.24 -3.21 -5.78 8.51 204.37
lnged -4.73 -8.33 2.97 54.76 20.50 9.73 3.06 -9.62 -317.25
lnempr 12.63 -30.70 41.45 -59.43 48.05 18.72 -2.02 -3.81 -175.35
lneind -9.99 3.00 -1.82 -33.69 37.09 -2.99 9.23 -7.87 12.62
lnatss -2.26 9.35 6.85 -11.77 4.68 -5.85 3.00 -1.34 7.74
gbcd -1.48 -2.78 -3.54 11.50 -0.93 2.21 -0.52 87.68 -40.78
_cons -55.35 122.87 -205.88 315.66 -346.82 -77.42 -23.63 39.15 1269.57
lex
ed
u
 
 
Table B.3 Covariance matrix elements GHΩ  
lngeh lnurbr lnpopd lneser lntrad lntbpr lnhivr gbcd _cons
lngeh 17.99 -8.23 -1.66 -6.47 -29.30 -5.38 -1.22 1.41 153.15
lngeg -4.99 -10.06 2.49 8.17 37.34 6.80 1.59 -4.84 -186.36
lnurbr -15.13 77.81 5.85 -1.41 -7.06 -1.12 -0.40 5.71 -192.27
lnpopd 0.52 6.76 7.29 -0.49 -1.68 -0.34 -0.06 0.13 -40.24
gbcd -3.20 3.05 0.32 1.38 6.23 1.15 0.26 93.25 -56.11
_cons 16.91 -204.56 -54.60 -17.17 -79.29 -14.70 -3.14 -14.79 1336.53
lex
g
dp
 
 
Table B.4 Covariance matrix elements EEΩ  
lngeh lnged lnempr lneind lnatss gbcd _cons
lngeh 622.87
lnged -393.37 566.21
lnempr 731.71 474.89 9773.02
lneind -226.48 138.76 1123.83 1356.13
lnatss -9.36 -161.05 -129.53 -134.61 538.54
gbcd -84.04 95.20 -266.64 28.43 -191.72 1354.19
_cons -2788.06 -2843.36 -48028.6 -8319.12 -117.01 1308.04 246931.1
edu
ed
u
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Table B.5 Covariance matrix elements GEΩ  
lngeh lnged lnempr lneind lnatss gbcd _cons
lngeh -31.90 17.31 -22.68 25.09 5.87 1.76 32.44
lngeg 30.23 -22.99 16.56 -29.63 -7.07 -0.91 39.61
lnurbr -1.35 5.45 14.86 1.57 -5.25 1.76 -66.84
lnpopd -2.29 -0.92 -23.97 5.16 -4.77 2.44 110.01
gbcd 6.26 -3.62 5.63 -5.49 -1.27 -63.63 3.44
_cons -48.25 54.62 21.05 56.45 54.79 -4.09 -514.84
edu
gd
p
 
 
Table B.6 Covariance matrix elements GGΩ  
lngeh lngeg lnurbr lnpopd gbcd _cons
lngeh 187.91
lngeg -190.25 242.19
lnurbr -7.72 -44.01 207.07
lnpopd 8.93 -10.17 18.27 20.43
gbcd -38.22 40.48 5.04 -2.00 267.05
_cons 421.37 -522.20 -497.07 -109.70 -154.17 3618.29
gdp
gd
p
 
 
Appendix C. Country names and labels 
 
Table C.1  Country data availability and labels 
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
BEN Benin x x x MDG Madagascar x x x
BWA Botswana x x MWI Malawi x x
BFA Burkinoa Faso x x MLI Mali x x
BDI Burundi x x x MRT Mauritania x x x
CMR Cameroon x x MUS Mauritius x x x
TCD Chad x NAM Namibia x x
COM Comoros x NER Niger x x
COG Congo, Republic of x x RWA Rwanda x
CIV Côte d'Ivoire x x SEN Senegal x x
GNQ Equatorial Guinea x x ZAF South Africa x x x
ETH Ethiopia x x x SWZ Swaziland x
GMB Gambia, The x x TGO Togo x x x
GHA Ghana x UGA Uganda x x
GNB Giunea-Bisseau x ZMB Zambia x x
LSO Lesotho x x
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